Advocacy & Safety - Unbelievable

Cyclist's Strange DUI-Manslaughter Trial Opens Today
Prosecutors say Laura Roberts took prescription pills and drank beer before causing a fatal crash.
By RICHARD RAEKE, St. Petersburg Times Staff Writer
Published November 16, 2003

NEW PORT RICHEY - Laura Roberts had taken three prescription pills and drunk a number of beers before riding her bike in the dark along U.S. 19 on the night of Feb. 27, 2000, prosecutors contend. They say that chemical combination caused her to unsteadily ride into the southbound lanes of U.S. 19 in Hudson, near Puffin Lane, into the path of William Anderson and his Chevrolet Monte Carlo.

Anderson swerved sharply to avoid her, crossed the median and slammed into a northbound Nissan truck. Anderson's wife and mother were killed in the crash.

The State Attorney's Office charged Roberts, then 41, with driving under the influence with manslaughter. She had a blood alcohol level of .07, just under the legal limit of .08.

The case is set for trial Monday, attracting the attention of Court TV. Prosecutors had planned to bring Roberts to trial in spring 2002 but she skipped bail.

She was brought back to Florida after being arrested in Nassau County, New York - on a drunken driving charge.

Her case is notable not only for the odd circumstances, but because of some odd twists of DUI law.

Roberts' attorney, Fredrick Susaneck of West Palm Beach, says the Florida Highway Patrol troopers who arrived at the accident scene illegally obtained blood and urine samples from his client. Under the state's implied consent law, drivers, by getting behind the wheel, give their consent to submit to breath, blood or urine tests if they are suspected of driving under the influence.

Any driver who refuses to submit to a sobriety test can have their license suspended for 12 months, or 18 months if they have refused the test before.

The police can mandatorily test any driver involved in a collision that results in severe injury or death.

The catch in Robert's case, according to Susaneck?

Although a bicycle is defined as a vehicle under Florida law, the implied consent law applies to "motor vehicles." In a motion to suppress all evidence before Circuit Judge Michael Andrews, Susaneck argued that the troopers could not use implied consent to get the blood and urine samples from Roberts.

"As Florida law excludes bicycles from the definition of motor vehicles, the arrest of the defendant was illegal, any evidence gathered was unlawfully obtained and is fruit of the poisonous tree," he wrote in his motion.

Andrews denied the motion. During an October hearing, Andrews questioned whether the Legislature had really intended to exclude bicycles from the implied consent law.

Assistant State Attorney Debra Tuomey argued successfully that even if the implied consent law doesn't apply because Roberts was riding a bicycle, other laws allowed the troopers to take the blood and urine samples.

The U.S. Supreme Court found that defendants could have their blood drawn without their consent. And Roberts had caused a fatal accident, meeting a second standard.

But Susaneck said Andrews's ruling has already given him grounds to appeal the case, should Roberts be found guilty.

This case, more than any other biking while intoxicated, has the potential to clarify the law, defense attorneys say.

"It does seem like it's ripe for attack. A lot of times those charges get reduced," said Clearwater attorney Denis de Vlaming, former president of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. "I don't know of anyone who has challenged implied consent on a bike."

People being charged for biking while intoxicated is not uncommon, he added, but in 31 years of criminal defense work, he has never heard of a case similar to Roberts'.

The discrepancy in the implied consent law might be oversight on the part of the Legislature. It might not have envisioned a drunken bicyclist with the potential to kill a driver, said St. Petersburg attorney Frank Russo, who specializes in DUI and criminal cases.

"Perhaps the bicycle can't do much damage but the operation of it could jeopardize the safety of other motorists," he added.

Still, you would not bring a drunken pedestrian up on DUI - manslaughter charges if that person stumbled into traffic and caused a fatal accident, de Vlaming said.

"The only difference is the person was on a bike," he added.

J. Larry Hart, a criminal defense attorney from New Port Richey, said that according to the definition of motor vehicle used in the state statutes, the implied consent law specifically excludes bicycles.

But law enforcement officers can use other justifications for obtaining the blood and urine samples after a fatal crash.

As society's attitudes toward drunk driving have become more strict, the implied consent law has become increasingly complex. The law has seen 15 changes in 19 years, Hart said. Some are merely cosmetic alterations, but the law remains "extremely complicated." Roberts' case, he added, "certainly raises some real questions.

"Perhaps the bicycle can't do much damage but the operation of it could jeopardize the safety of other motorists," he added.

Jacob added, "And to be sarcastic, I would like to add that a squirrel or a rabbit if you are a Monty Python fan can slaughter the best knights or commuters in search of the Holy Grail."

What is the unbelievable part?

What is the unbelievable part?


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Headwinds and hills are better than couchs and clickers.


The unbelievable part is that we live in such a violent culture, and another unbelievable part is that prescription pills can be grounds for a manslaughter case.

Jacob
former 188 pounder

Thought this might be an interesting read...thanks fark.com

http://www.sptimes.com/2003/11/16/Pasco/Cyclist_s_strange_DUI.shtml

316.193 Driving under the influence; penalties.--

(1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:

(a) The person is under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893, when affected to the extent that the person's normal faculties are impaired;

(b) The person has a blood-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood; or

(c) The person has a breath-alcohol level of 0.08 or more grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.

(2)(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), subsection (3), or subsection (4), any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) shall be punished:

1. By a fine of:

a. Not less than $250 or more than $500 for a first conviction.

b. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a second conviction; and

2. By imprisonment for:

a. Not more than 6 months for a first conviction.

b. Not more than 9 months for a second conviction.


(3) Any person:

(a) Who is in violation of subsection (1);

(b) Who operates a vehicle; and

(c) Who, by reason of such operation, causes or contributes to causing:

1. Damage to the property or person of another commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

2. Serious bodily injury to another, as defined in s. 316.1933, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

3. The death of any human being commits DUI manslaughter, and commits:

a. A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:

(I) At the time of the crash, the person knew, or should have known, that the crash occurred; and

(II) The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

(4) Any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.20 or higher, or any person who is convicted of a violation of subsection (1) and who at the time of the offense was accompanied in the vehicle by a person under the age of 18 years, shall be punished:

(a) By a fine of:

1. Not less than $500 or more than $1,000 for a first conviction.

2. Not less than $1,000 or more than $2,000 for a second conviction.

3. Not less than $2,000 for a third or subsequent conviction.

(b) By imprisonment for:

1. Not more than 9 months for a first conviction.

2. Not more than 12 months for a second conviction.

For the purposes of this subsection, only the instant offense is required to be a violation of subsection (1) by a person who has a blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level of 0.20 or higher.

(c) In addition to the penalties in paragraphs (a) and (b), the court shall order the mandatory placement, at the convicted person's sole expense, of an ignition interlock device approved by the department in accordance with s. 316.1938 upon all vehicles that are individually or jointly leased or owned and routinely operated by the convicted person for up to 6 months for the first offense and for at least 2 years for a second offense, when the convicted person qualifies for a permanent or restricted license. The installation of such device may not occur before July 1, 2003.

(5) The court shall place all offenders convicted of violating this section on monthly reporting probation and shall require completion of a substance abuse course conducted by a DUI program licensed by the department under s. 322.292, which must include a psychosocial evaluation of the offender. If the DUI program refers the offender to an authorized substance abuse treatment provider for substance abuse treatment, in addition to any sentence or fine imposed under this section, completion of all such education, evaluation, and treatment is a condition of reporting probation. The offender shall assume reasonable costs for such education, evaluation, and treatment. The referral to treatment resulting from a psychosocial evaluation shall not be waived without a supporting independent psychosocial evaluation conducted by an authorized substance abuse treatment provider appointed by the court, which shall have access to the DUI program's psychosocial evaluation before the independent psychosocial evaluation is conducted. The court shall review the results and recommendations of both evaluations before determining the request for waiver. The offender shall bear the full cost of this procedure. The term "substance abuse" means the abuse of alcohol or any substance named or described in Schedules I through V of s. 893.03. If an offender referred to treatment under this subsection fails to report for or complete such treatment or fails to complete the DUI program substance abuse education course and evaluation, the DUI program shall notify the court and the department of the failure. Upon receipt of the notice, the department shall cancel the offender's driving privilege, notwithstanding the terms of the court order or any suspension or revocation of the driving privilege. The department may temporarily reinstate the driving privilege on a restricted basis upon verification from the DUI program that the offender is currently participating in treatment and the DUI education course and evaluation requirement has been completed. If the DUI program notifies the department of the second failure to complete treatment, the department shall reinstate the driving privilege only after notice of completion of treatment from the DUI program. The organization that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation may not provide required substance abuse treatment unless a waiver has been granted to that organization by the department. A waiver may be granted only if the department determines, in accordance with its rules, that the service provider that conducts the substance abuse education and evaluation is the most appropriate service provider and is licensed under chapter 397 or is exempt from such licensure. A statistical referral report shall be submitted quarterly to the department by each organization authorized to provide services under this section.

(6) With respect to any person convicted of a violation of subsection (1), regardless of any penalty imposed pursuant to subsection (2), subsection (3), or subsection (4):

(a) For the first conviction, the court shall place the defendant on probation for a period not to exceed 1 year and, as a condition of such probation, shall order the defendant to participate in public service or a community work project for a minimum of 50 hours; or the court may order instead, that any defendant pay an additional fine of $10 for each hour of public service or community work otherwise required, if, after consideration of the residence or location of the defendant at the time public service or community work is required, payment of the fine is in the best interests of the state. However, the total period of probation and incarceration may not exceed 1 year. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle that was operated by or in the actual control of the defendant or any one vehicle registered in the defendant's name at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 10 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 10 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h).

(b) For the second conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 5 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 10 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 30 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 30 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver's license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)2. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(c) For the third or subsequent conviction for an offense that occurs within a period of 10 years after the date of a prior conviction for violation of this section, the court shall order imprisonment for not less than 30 days. The court must also, as a condition of probation, order the impoundment or immobilization of all vehicles owned by the defendant at the time of impoundment or immobilization, for a period of 90 days or for the unexpired term of any lease or rental agreement that expires within 90 days. The impoundment or immobilization must not occur concurrently with the incarceration of the defendant and must occur concurrently with the driver's license revocation imposed under s. 322.28(2)(a)3. The impoundment or immobilization order may be dismissed in accordance with paragraph (e), paragraph (f), paragraph (g), or paragraph (h). At least 48 hours of confinement must be consecutive.

(d) The court must at the time of sentencing the defendant issue an order for the impoundment or immobilization of a vehicle. Within 7 business days after the date that the court issues the order of impoundment or immobilization, the clerk of the court must send notice by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the registered owner of each vehicle, if the registered owner is a person other than the defendant, and to each person of record claiming a lien against the vehicle.

(e) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred may submit to the court a police report indicating that the vehicle was stolen at the time of the offense or documentation of having purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed from an entity other than the defendant or the defendant's agent. If the court finds that the vehicle was stolen or that the sale was not made to circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs. If the court denies the request to dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization, the petitioner may request an evidentiary hearing.

(f) A person who owns but was not operating the vehicle when the offense occurred, and whose vehicle was stolen or who purchased the vehicle after the offense was committed directly from the defendant or the defendant's agent, may request an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the impoundment or immobilization should occur. If the court finds that either the vehicle was stolen or the purchase was made without knowledge of the offense, that the purchaser had no relationship to the defendant other than through the transaction, and that such purchase would not circumvent the order and allow the defendant continued access to the vehicle, the order must be dismissed and the owner of the vehicle will incur no costs.

(g) The court shall also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of the vehicle if the court finds that the family of the owner of the vehicle has no other private or public means of transportation.

(h) The court may also dismiss the order of impoundment or immobilization of any vehicles that are owned by the defendant but that are operated solely by the employees of the defendant or any business owned by the defendant.

(i) All costs and fees for the impoundment or immobilization, including the cost of notification, must be paid by the owner of the vehicle or, if the vehicle is leased or rented, by the person leasing or renting the vehicle, unless the impoundment or immobilization order is dismissed. All provisions of s. 713.78 shall apply.

(j) The person who owns a vehicle that is impounded or immobilized under this paragraph, or a person who has a lien of record against such a vehicle and who has not requested a review of the impoundment pursuant to paragraph (e), paragraph (f), or paragraph (g), may, within 10 days after the date that person has knowledge of the location of the vehicle, file a complaint in the county in which the owner resides to determine whether the vehicle was wrongfully taken or withheld from the owner or lienholder. Upon the filing of a complaint, the owner or lienholder may have the vehicle released by posting with the court a bond or other adequate security equal to the amount of the costs and fees for impoundment or immobilization, including towing or storage, to ensure the payment of such costs and fees if the owner or lienholder does not prevail. When the bond is posted and the fee is paid as set forth in s. 28.24, the clerk of the court shall issue a certificate releasing the vehicle. At the time of release, after reasonable inspection, the owner or lienholder must give a receipt to the towing or storage company indicating any loss or damage to the vehicle or to the contents of the vehicle.

(k) A defendant, in the court's discretion, may be required to serve all or any portion of a term of imprisonment to which the defendant has been sentenced pursuant to this section in a residential alcoholism treatment program or a residential drug abuse treatment program. Any time spent in such a program must be credited by the court toward the term of imprisonment.

For the purposes of this section, any conviction for a violation of s. 327.35; a previous conviction for the violation of former s. 316.1931, former s. 860.01, or former s. 316.028; or a previous conviction outside this state for driving under the influence, driving while intoxicated, driving with an unlawful blood-alcohol level, driving with an unlawful breath-alcohol level, or any other similar alcohol-related or drug-related traffic offense, is also considered a previous conviction for violation of this section. However, in satisfaction of the fine imposed pursuant to this section, the court may, upon a finding that the defendant is financially unable to pay either all or part of the fine, order that the defendant participate for a specified additional period of time in public service or a community work project in lieu of payment of that portion of the fine which the court determines the defendant is unable to pay. In determining such additional sentence, the court shall consider the amount of the unpaid portion of the fine and the reasonable value of the services to be ordered; however, the court may not compute the reasonable value of services at a rate less than the federal minimum wage at the time of sentencing.

(7) A conviction under this section does not bar any civil suit for damages against the person so convicted.

(8) At the arraignment, or in conjunction with any notice of arraignment provided by the clerk of the court, the clerk shall provide any person charged with a violation of this section with notice that upon conviction the court shall suspend or revoke the offender's driver's license and that the offender should make arrangements for transportation at any proceeding in which the court may take such action. Failure to provide such notice does not affect the court's suspension or revocation of the offender's driver's license.

(9) A person who is arrested for a violation of this section may not be released from custody:

(a) Until the person is no longer under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substance set forth in s. 877.111, or any substance controlled under chapter 893 and affected to the extent that his or her normal faculties are impaired;

(b) Until the person's blood-alcohol level or breath-alcohol level is less than 0.05; or

(c) Until 8 hours have elapsed from the time the person was arrested.

(10) The rulings of the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles under s. 322.2615 shall not be considered in any trial for a violation of this section. Testimony or evidence from the administrative proceedings or any written statement submitted by a person in his or her request for administrative review is inadmissible into evidence or for any other purpose in any criminal proceeding, unless timely disclosed in criminal discovery pursuant to Rule 3.220, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure.

(11) The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles is directed to adopt rules providing for the implementation of the use of ignition interlock devices.


Here's Florida's DUI law. Mind everyone that it states vehicle.

Here's Floridas first paragraph and section of bicycle law clearly states that the operator of a bicycle is

316.2065 Bicycle regulations.--

(1) Every person propelling a vehicle by human power has all of the rights and all of the duties applicable to the driver of any other vehicle under this chapter, except as to special regulations in this chapter, and except as to provisions of this chapter which by their nature can have no application.

Here's definition of Bicycle.

2) BICYCLE.--Every vehicle propelled solely by human power, and every motorized bicycle propelled by a combination of human power and an electric helper motor capable of propelling the vehicle at a speed of not more than 20 miles per hour on level ground upon which any person may ride, having two tandem wheels, and including any device generally recognized as a bicycle though equipped with two front or two rear wheels. The term does not include such a vehicle with a seat height of no more than 25 inches from the ground when the seat is adjusted to its highest position or a scooter or similar device. No person under the age of 16 may operate or ride upon a motorized bicycle.

Here's definition of Vehicle.

75) VEHICLE.--Every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.

Note it states EVERY DEVICE.

If her action caused the reaction of the driver due to her physical control of that vehicle, she is able to be charged with vehicular manslaughter. Strange but true.

Still, you would not bring a drunken pedestrian up on DUI - manslaughter charges if that person stumbled into traffic and caused a fatal accident, de Vlaming said.


No you wouldn't because they are not in physical control of a vehicle as the lady is charged with. There are other laws that that pedestrian can be charged with due to their actions.

The unbelievable part is that we live in such a violent culture, and another unbelievable part is that prescription pills can be grounds for a manslaughter case.

Jacob
former 188 pounder

Whats so unbelievable about it? Her actions caused the death of someone she should be held accountable for that. Using the argument that society is violent or just the fact that it is prescription drugs as an excuse in this case is pretty lame. Which since the prescriptions were taken in conjunction with alcohol make it a very irresponsible act. Also did you notice the unbelievable act that she skipped bail and then was arrested again for a DUI?

another unbelievable part is that prescription pills can be grounds for a manslaughter case.



Knowing what 'prescription pills' and the ordered dosage we're talking about might make this believable.

The driver is guilty of violating Darwin's law.
The wrong set of genes were killed in this case.

Isn't that the way it usually is? :o

I'm getting a bit confused here. In which ways is a person driving or riding a bike, that is under the influence of an intoxicating substance, which includes prescription medication, makes this so unbelievable?

The lady, got onto her bike, after taking prescription pills and drinking alcohol, rode off and into traffic. Forcing a person to take evasive action to avoid killing her, thus going into on comming traffic and hitting another on comming vehicle mortally wounding themself.

Cyclist or not she is still in physical control of the bicycle and all DUI laws state vehicle and not just motor vehicle.

The unbelivable part is that Florida has excluded bicycles from the definition of 'motor vehicles', to the point that the DWI charges may get tossed.

I realize I live in a state often regarded as hick or backward, but an issue like this would never come up.

Heck, there have been DWI charges against people on horseback that have been upheld on appeal in this state.

Btw what was the prescription medication specifically?
Do you know?

Jacob

that it is prescription drugs as an excuse in this case is pretty lame. Which since the prescriptions were taken in conjunction with alcohol make it a very irresponsible act. Also did you notice the unbelievable act that she skipped bail and then was arrested again for a DUI?


You can take many meds. with alcohol, no problem. The article is not specific about which meds. were taken. That is unbelievable, to not say what the medication was. Was it marijuana or chemotherapy? (or antifungus?) DUI is stupid.
So, it is unbelievable to be DUI.(and to skip bail and do DUI.) But I did not read that Part. I think if you must get a prescription to treat an illness or whatever, then there is no reason to become part of a violent situation such as this one - the accident in the article. But the article implies that taking a prescription medication is something that can be done to cause an accident when drinking, more so than just drinking, without saying which medication in particular. That is unbelievable. It would be understandable to say that it is a fact that someone got in an accident because of drinking while using heroin, drinking while taking heavy sedatives, drinking while taking heavy chemotherapy which weakened the vitality, or just drinking; however, it is unbelievable that someone would say that "prescription" medications can contribute to fatality without any further clarity...

Jacob

Jacob

Okay, I'll start here:


You can take many meds. with alcohol, no problem. The article is not specific about which meds. were taken. That is unbelievable, to not say what the medication was.

I worked in a pharmacy for 3 years at a pharmacy tech. It's actually quite amazing how many prescription drugs you should not take with alcohol due to side effects. The other very unfortunate thing is we may never know what they were. When a person is tagged with DUI drugs, they police department has blood drawn then it's sent to the local forensic's lab test it for the contents. And also I'll tell you from experience, normally if you said you took something like Tylenol, Advil, Pennicillin, Immodium, stuff like the normal things that you would take for illness prescription or not, they aren't going to hit you with that. It's the stuff like Soma, Vicoden, Percocet, Tylenol 3, or stuff that will have an adverse reaction. Though her BAC was .07, which is under the legal limit, she must have shown more that just a bit of imparement for them to consider the DUI Drugs count.

Now for this one:


The unbelivable part is that Florida has excluded bicycles from the definition of 'motor vehicles', to the point that the DWI charges may get tossed.


First of all they haven't.


1) A person is guilty of the offense of driving under the influence and is subject to punishment as provided in subsection (2) if the person is driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state and:


Now, where does that state "Motor Vehicle?" It specifically states just vehicle and under definition of vehicle bicycle is included as a man powered or self powered personal transportation unit.


75) VEHICLE.--Every device, in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, excepting devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.


Now the reason that they are possibly going to toss it is the Admin Per Se clause. That's the thing that when you sign your drivers license, if you refuse to take any of the sobriety tests or refuse to take a breathalyzer, the police department can get a search warrant for blood. Now the way it sounds they just took the blood at the hospital, which is a common practice during any accident with injuries and or death involved due to the nature of the beast. The lawyer is trying to say that they did that under the Admin Per Se clause which is specific to "Motor Vehicles" only because of the drivers license. So it appears her lawyer is trying to get her off on a possible technicality that the police may have done an Admin Per Se search warrant when it more appears that they did routine blood draw for the accident itself.

I was in an accident several years ago where a drunk hit me. I went to the hospital because of a 6 inch cut on the top of my head. I had just left work not 3 minutes prior when it occurred, so no time to get a drink down. They still did blood draw to check for impairment due to the nature of the accident.

Yeah it's unbelievable that her lawyer is trying to get her off on a technicality.

charges against people on horseback that have been upheld on appeal in this state.

Was the horse drunk too? Is this part of that song "Whiskey for my men, beer for my horses"?

Seen a few drunk horses, but most have enough sense to say enough.