Originally Posted by CB HI

Folks, if you are truly interested in the ID Card subject and confirming for yourself that a cyclist is only required to provide basic verbal identifying information if stopped by police, please read the Hiibel case. It is long and may be a little hard to follow, but it is worth while to understand your rights.

Originally Posted by CB HI

McKay was never arrested and charged with not carrying or producing an ID Card to police. His arrest and charges were for riding the wrong way on his bicycle and possession of illegal drugs. Again, California does not have any law on its books that requires a cyclist to carry an ID Card or produce an to police. Additionally, the McKay Court Decision does not construct any requirement that a cyclist must carry an ID Card and if the cyclist refuses, then police may arrest and charge the cyclist for not having the ID Card with them.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

Nonsense. Legal scholars, judges, and lawyers all advance legal theories based on scholarly analysis of the law, or as you put it, "construct law without legal basis."
In 1896, the Supreme Court held that segregation is constitutional, under the theory of "separate but equal." Jusrtice Harlan dissented, arguing that .......
Justice Harlan's dissent was not law, but it was nevertheless a valid legal argument against "separate but equal." By your argument, you would dismiss his legal theory as an "attempt to construct law without legal basis."

Originally Posted by Blue Order

The law instructs officers to take arrestees into custodial arrest if they fail to produce ID. That is fact. It also instructs them to take arrestees into custodial arrest if the refuse to give their written promise to appear before a magistrate. That is also fact. It does not instruct them to take an arrestee before a magistrate if the arrestee does not have a pen.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

No, it doesn't establish that. Not at all. You're just making things up now.

Originally Posted by sailorman13

here is the bottom line on cyclist and id cards. The hiibel us supreme court case firmly establishes that if a cyclist is stopped by police either for investigation or arrest, all the cyclist must do, is verbally provide their correct name and birth date. No state laws can override this. So no state can legally compel cyclist to carry or present an id card to police.



What part is he making up? That the hiibel case establishes it, or that no state can legally compel a cyclist to carry or present an id card to police?
The fact is that no state can compel a cyclist to present an id. At least not yet. That was the subject of this thread. You chose to make it an argument about the practical consequences of not carrying an id in the event you are cited/arrested for a traffic violation. I'm telling you that it makes little difference because of the wide discretion the police are given. If a cop wants to take you into custody, he will take you into custody. Id or no id ("looked fake/tampered with to me"). Any evidence that arises from that custodial detention will be upheld in court because the supremes have already ruled that custodial arrests subsequent to a traffic violation are legal regardless of the severity of the original offense. If a cop takes you downtown after a ticket for a bad taillight and finds drugs on you, it will be upheld. That is one result of the texas seatbelt case.

in the real world, full of capricious leos, a compliant arrestee without id will probably have less chance of being taken into custody than a belligerent one with an id. Procedural rules be damned. if he wants to take you into custudy, leo will justify his detention however he needs to. All else being equal and given a rational leo who got up on the right side of the bed, producing an id may convince him not to take you into custody if you are cited for a traffic violation. Or not.

Originally Posted by Sailorman13

What part is he making up? That the Hiibel case establishes it, or that no state can legally compel a cyclist to carry or present an ID card to police?

Originally Posted by Sailorman13

The fact is that no state can compel a cyclist to present an ID. At least not yet. That was the subject of this thread. You chose to make it an argument about the practical consequences of not carrying an ID in the event you are cited/arrested for a traffic violation.

Originally Posted by Sailorman13

A valid legal argument or theory from a dissenting judge is not the same as legal precedent. Thank God. It took a separate case to settle it. Meanwhile "separate but equal" was the law of the land. Case law is not established based on dissenting opinions.

Originally Posted by Sailorman13

The law instructs officers to take arrestees into custodial arrest if they fail to produce ID AND refuse to give their written promise. But guess what, the seatbelt case you cited previously established that they can take you into custody even if you DO provide ID and sign a promise to appear. So it's moot. If you have an ID and violate a traffic law you can be taken into custody despite any procedural rules. If you don't produce an ID you can be taken into custody despite any procedural rules.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

He made up all of it. Every single thing he's had to say about Hiibel is a figment of his misreading of the case. No discussion of cyclists. No discussion of ID cards. No establishing that if stopped for investigation or arrest, all one must do is provide one's name. No establishing that no state can legally compel cyclists to carry or present an ID card to police. All made up.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

Now, as to whether or not a state can legally compel a cyclist to carry ID-- Absolutely, yes they can. No state has done so yet, but the state legislatures certainly have the power to pass laws requiring cyclists to be licensed and to carry their license with them. In the absence of such laws, no cyclist can be legally compelled to carry ID. But the state does have the power to require it, if it so chooses.

Originally Posted by CB HI

I am not making anything up. The Hiibel case does not HAVE to specify cyclist to apply to cyclist. It applies to anyone not engage in the operation of a motor vehicle. And my statements of the Hiibel case are the effective outcome of the decision.

Originally Posted by CB HI

Now you are making things up. Get a state to pass such a law and just see how the US Supreme Court rules on that one. And no doubt they would reference the Hiibel case in their ruling.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

You know, CB HI, if you really believe Hiibel says what you think it does, the easiest way to resolve the disagreement is to quote the relevant parts of the decision that you believe support your interpretation....

Originally Posted by CB HI

The entire ruling and I have already posted the link. The case ruling needs to be taken in it's entirety.

Originally Posted by CB HI

Have you noticed that you are the only one arguing for your view of these cases and law. Blue Order is right and everyone else here is wrong!

Originally Posted by Blue Order

The problem with that is you're saying "the entire case supports my position"

Originally Posted by 1454 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1449

I. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” Since the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in 1791, the Supreme Court has carved out several narrow exceptions to the initial requirement that police obtain a warrant before executing a search and seizure. The most significant of these exceptions arose in the landmark case of Terry v. Ohio, decided in 1968 and still relied upon today.


A. The Terry “Reasonable Suspicion” Standard
Terry established that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the police from stopping a person for investigative purposes when they have a “reasonable suspicion” that the individual may be involved in criminal activity, even when that suspicion does not reach the level of probable cause necessary to make an arrest. In deciding the case, the Court engaged in a painstaking balancing analysis of government goals against privacy rights, and in the end focused on the government’s interest in crime prevention and detection. It found that police should be given a “narrowly drawn authority” to stop a person and conduct a reasonable investigation, including a limited search for weapons, when an officer can list “specific and articulable facts” to suggest that criminal activity is afoot. The Court noted that in making this assessment, officers must judge the facts against an objective standard: “would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure . . . ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate?”
In a concurrence designed to clarify parts of the majority opinion, Justice White described the scope of the interrogation that might occur during an investigatory Terry stop. While he conceded that nothing in the Constitution prevents the police from addressing questions to anyone on the street, he stressed that an individual who is stopped “is not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest, although it may alert the officer to the need for continued observation.” In so stating, Justice White attempted to highlight the boundaries of the Court’s decision, and hence to minimize its impact on Fourth Amendment protections.


B. Terry’s Progeny
In creating a new breed of police investigative stops, Terry set forth a standard that proved relatively vague and became vulnerable to lower courts’ subjective interpretations. As a result, the Court has been called upon many times since 1968 to clarify its intent regarding the “reasonable suspicion” standard and the principles that Terry espoused. Factors the Court has considered in determining what constitutes permissible Terry stops include a suspect’s behavior patterns, the location of the stop, a suspect’s race, and the credibility of an anonymous tip. Even wholly innocent factors, when taken together, may add up to reasonable suspicion in certain situations. While the “reasonable suspicion” standard has continued to evolve with new fact patterns, the Court has held steadfast in its position that the scope of a Terry stop is limited: the stop must be brief; the suspect must be free to leave after a short period of time; and, most importantly, the suspect is free to decline to answer questions. Until Hiibel, the Court had not drifted significantly from these restraints on the Terry doctrine in the thirtysix years since it decided that case.


II. THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY:
HIIBEL’S DECISION TO COMPEL IDENTIFICATION COMPROMISES TERRY AND ERODES PRIVACY RIGHTS

Hiibel forced the Supreme Court to finally take a stance on the constitutionality of state “stop and identify” statutes. In a line of cases that preceded Hiibel, the Court had invalidated most such statutes for vagueness, but quietly left the door open for a statute narrow enough to pass constitutional muster. In deciding Hiibel and validating Nevada’s “stop and identify” statute, the Court set the standard by allowing officers to obtain a suspect’s name, but nothing more.
...Although the Court noted that its decision validates an officer’s request for a name only,...

A. “Stop and Identify” Statutes

The Nevada law that Mr. Hiibel was charged with violating is called a “stop and identify” statute. Roughly twenty states have varying versions of such statutes, which generally permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. In some states, a suspect’s refusal to identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or a civil violation, while in others it is merely a factor police can consider in determining whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In states without “stop and identify” statutes, a suspect may refuse to identify himself without penalty. The Supreme Court’s prior case law regarding “stop and identify” statutes invalidated vague language that allowed police to request identification in general, but left the door open for a more specific articulation of the rule.

Originally Posted by Daily Commute

I also don't see how it's a bad thing for cops to be able to identify lawbreakers. So what if it's just a red light violation? We're not talking about a cop randomly stopping someone and asking for their papers. We're talking about allowing cops to make sure they are writing a ticket to the right person.

Originally Posted by Daily Commute

Finally, if you want a cop to wonder if you have a felony warrant out for you, by all means, play ID games. You are more likely to turn a warning into a ticket, a ticket into a minor crime, and a minor crime into something serious. But when you get to court, you can always say it's OK because some anonymous dude on the Internet said it was OK.

Originally Posted by CB HI

Originally Posted by Blue Order

Let me refresh your memory: YOU are the one who argued that a legal analysis has no precedential value, that the only thing that matters is the majority opinion itself.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

And just to clarify here, Terry v. Ohio establishes that an officer may stop and frisk a person, without violating the 4th amendment, when the officer has reasonable suspicion. Hiibel establishes that a Nevada statute requiring a person to give an officer his or her name when the officer has reasonable suspicion does not violate the 4th amendment.

Neither ruling is relevant to stops where the officer has probable cause.

Your argument that Hiibel acts as a bar on state laws addressing what an officer may do when the officer has probable cause is nonsensical, as is your belief that Hiibel somehow prevents the state from regulating cycling.

Originally Posted by CB HI

No one even knows your current position!
This is a dishonest distortion. You attempted to convert Justice Brown's, “Dissenting Opinion” into law.

Originally Posted by CB HI

I have merely posted a law review of the 'Majority Ruling' that nicely summarizes the Hiibel case by the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW. It summarizes the 'Majority Ruling' in a manor easy for everyone here to understand.

Originally Posted by CB HI

So in summary: Blue Order is right, the others in this thread are wrong and the AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW is wrong.

Or is it that Blue Order is NOW arguing, just to argue.

Originally Posted by Blue Order

First, I'm only arguing with you; you've somehow turned that into "the others in this thread."

Originally Posted by CB HI

If a suspect has to verbally give his name during a Terry stop under reasonable suspicion, then clearly the ruling and wording in the Hiibel case compels a suspect to verbally provide his name during a probable cause stop/arrest.

Originally Posted by CB HI

In NONE of these cases, where a suspect is not operating a motor vehicle, does the individual have to carry/ provide an ID Card OR be arrested/convicted of not carrying/providing an ID Card; as your early post implied.

Originally Posted by CB HI

The worst that will happen is that you get a free ride directly to the judge to promptly resolve the case for any traffic violation you may have committed (assuming most of us do not carry illegal drugs, other illegal items and that we do not have any outstanding warrants).

Originally Posted by CB HI

I suspect that surreal, GodsBassist, Speedo, Dchiefransom, Sailorman13, and -=Łem in Pa=- views may differ with this claim of yours.

Originally Posted by CB HI

And the pointless Blue Order tangents continue.